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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Thousands of retired professional football players filed 
suit against the National Football League and various other 
defendants alleging primarily that the defendants failed to 
take reasonable actions to protect players from the risks 
associated with concussive and sub-concussive head injuries.  
The cases were consolidated before the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  On July 7, 2014, the 
District Court issued an order that “preliminarily approved” a 
proposed class-action settlement agreement and 
“conditionally certified for settlement purposes only” the 
settlement class and subclasses.  Petitioners, seven retired 
professional football players who object to the proposed 
settlement agreement and class certification, filed a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) petition for permission to 
appeal the District Court’s July 7, 2014 order. 
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 At issue in this request for interlocutory review is the 
nature of this Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 23(f).  Because 
the District Court’s order was not an “order granting or 
denying class-action certification” under the plain text of the 
rule, we have dismissed the petition.1 
I.    
 Plaintiffs are retired professional football players who 
played in a member club of the National Football League 
(“NFL”) and are not seeking active employment as players 
with any member club.  Beginning in July 2011, retired 
professional football players began filing lawsuits alleging 
that Defendants NFL and NFL Properties, LLC (collectively 
“NFL Defendants”) failed to take reasonable actions to 
protect players from the chronic risks posed by concussive 
and sub-concussive head injuries.2   In January 2012, after 
more than 5,000 retired professional football players brought 
                                              
1 On September 11, 2014, we entered the following Order: 
“The foregoing Petition of Objecting Class Members pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) for Leave to Appeal 
from the District Court’s Order granting Settlement Class 
Certification is denied.  The Court will issue an Opinion in 
this matter at a later time.”  This Opinion provides the 
rationale for our Order.  
2 Various plaintiffs also brought suit against a helmet 
manufacturer, Riddell, Inc., and several of its affiliated 
entities (collectively “Riddell Defendants”). The Riddell 
Defendants are not parties to the class-action settlement at 
issue in this pending Rule 23(f) petition.  
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suit, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
consolidated and transferred all pending cases to the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for 
inclusion in coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. 
 Plaintiffs and the NFL Defendants (collectively “the 
parties”) negotiated the terms of a settlement during a court-
ordered mediation in the summer of 2013.3  Plaintiffs filed 
their class-action complaint on January 6, 2014 and sought an 
order: (1) granting preliminary approval of the proposed 
class-action settlement agreement; (2) conditionally certifying 
a settlement class and subclasses; (3) appointing co-lead 
counsel, class counsel, and subclass counsel; (4) approving 
the dissemination of class notice; (5) scheduling a fairness 
hearing; and (6) staying claims as to the NFL Defendants and 
enjoining proposed settlement class members from pursuing 
related lawsuits.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, Dkt. 5634 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2014). 
 On January 14, 2014, the District Court denied the 
parties’ motion without prejudice.  The District Court’s initial 
denial was based on its primary concern that “not all Retired 
NFL Football Players who ultimately receive a Qualifying 
Diagnosis or their related claimants will be paid.”  In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. 
                                              
3 On July 8, 2013, the District Court directed the parties to 
mediation before a retired district judge.  On August 29, 
2013, the parties signed a term sheet incorporating the 
principal terms of a settlement.  
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Supp. 2d 708, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  The District Court 
reasoned that the proposed $670,000,000 monetary fund may 
be inadequate to cover the likely amount of the awards to the 
class members.  Id. at 715–16. 
 The parties renegotiated the proposed class-action 
settlement and, on June 25, 2014, filed another motion for 
preliminary approval and conditional certification of a revised 
settlement agreement.  The revised settlement agreement 
“guaranteed payment of all valid claims” but put in place 
“additional measures designed to prevent fraudulent claims.”  
In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB, Dkt. 6073-5 at 23–24 (E.D. 
Pa. June 25, 2014).4  The parties also proposed that a 
“nationwide Settlement Class” be “conditionally certified, for 
                                              
4 The revised settlement created several avenues for 
compensation: (a) a Baseline Assessment Program Fund of up 
to $75,000,000 to offer retired NFL Football Players one 
baseline neuropsychological and neurological examination to 
identify any neurological defects, id. at 18–21; (b) an 
uncapped Monetary Awards Fund to provide payment of cash 
Monetary Awards and Derivative Claimant Awards to Retired 
NFL Football Players diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis 
and their Representative and Derivative Claimants, id. at 21–
27; and (c) a $10,000,000 Education Fund to support 
education about cognitive impairment, safety, and injury 
prevention with regard to football players, id. at 27. 
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settlement purposes only” and include three types of 
claimants and two subclasses.5  Id. Dkt. 6073-1 at 4, 5.   
                                              
5 The three types of claimants include:  
(1) “All living NFL Football Players who, prior 
to the date of the Preliminary Approval and 
Class Certification Order, retired, formally or 
informally, from playing professional football 
with the NFL or any Member Club, including 
American Football League, World League of 
American Football, NFL Europe League and 
NFL Europa League players, or were formerly 
on any roster, including preseason, regular 
season, or postseason of any such Member Club 
or league and who no longer are under contract 
to a Member Club and are not seeking active 
employment as players with any Member Club, 
whether signed to a roster or signed to any 
practice squad, developmental squad, or taxi 
squad of a Member Club (‘Retired NFL 
Football Players’);” 
(2) “Authorized representatives, ordered by a 
court or other official of competent jurisdiction 
under applicable state law, of deceased or 
legally incapacitated or incompetent Retired 
NFL Football Players (‘Representative 
Claimants’); and”  
(3) “Spouses, parents, children who are 
dependents or any other person who properly 
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under applicable state law assert the right to sue 
independently or derivatively by reason of their 
relationship with a Retired NFL Football Player 
or deceased Retired NFL Football Player 
(‘Derivative Claimants’).”  
Id. at 4. 
 The two subclasses of the Settlement Class consist of 
the following: 
(1) “Retired NFL Football Players who were 
not diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior 
to the date of the Preliminary Approval and 
Class Certification Order and their 
Representative Claimants and Derivative 
Claimants; and,” 
(2) “Retired NFL Football Players who were 
diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to 
the date of the Preliminary Approval and Class 
Certification Order and their Representative 
Claimants and Derivative Claimants, and the 
Representative Claimants of deceased Retired 
NFL Football Players who were diagnosed with 
a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to death or who 
died prior to the date of the Preliminary 
Approval and Class Certification Order and 
who received a post-mortem diagnosis of 
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy.” 
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).   
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 On July 2, 2014, seven retired NFL football players 
(collectively “Objectors”) filed an objection to the June 25, 
2014 revised class-action settlement agreement.  Objectors 
argued that the revised settlement agreement could not be 
certified under Rule 23 because it bargained away, without 
adequate representation, the rights of three distinct groups of 
former players: (1) those suffering from, or displaying 
symptoms consistent with, chronic traumatic encephalopathy 
who did not die before preliminary approval; (2) those who 
have suffered or are at risk of suffering a stroke or non-
football traumatic brain injury; and (3) those who played in 
NFL Europe.  Additional defects raised by Objectors include 
that: the proposed notice was false and misleading; the claims 
process was so onerous and confusing that it raised due 
process and fairness concerns; the settlement agreement was 
not the product of arm’s length negotiation; and that class 
counsel conducted no discovery by which to evaluate the 
strength of the claims and defenses.  
 On July 7, 2014, the District Court issued an order and 
memorandum in which the “proposed Class Action 
Settlement Agreement [was] preliminarily approved” and 
“[t]he Settlement Class and Subclasses [were] conditionally 
certified for settlement purposes only.”  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. 191, 
197, 204 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  In the District Court’s supporting 
                                                                                                     
 Because we do not address the merits of 
Objectors’ arguments, we decline to discuss whether 
the three types of claimants and subclasses satisfy the 
applicable Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements.  
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memorandum, it explained that Rule 23(e)(2) requires court 
approval of the settlement of a class action.  A “Preliminary 
Approval of the Proposed Settlement” was set forth by the 
District Court as:  
“typically proceed[ing] in two stages.  At the first 
stage, the parties submit the proposed settlement 
to the court, which must make a preliminary 
fairness evaluation.  If the proposed settlement is 
preliminarily acceptable, the court then directs 
that notice be provided to all class members who 
would be bound by the proposed settlement in 
order to afford them an opportunity to be heard 
on, object to, and opt out of the settlement.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), (e)(1), (e)(5).  At the 
second stage, after class members are notified of 
the settlement, the court holds a formal fairness 
hearing where class members may object to the 
settlement.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).  If 
the court concludes that the settlement is ‘fair, 
reasonable and adequate,’ the settlement is given 
final approval.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  At this 
time, Plaintiffs request that I grant preliminary 
approval.” 
Id. at 197.  After conducting a preliminary review of the 
settlement agreement, the District Court proceeded to analyze 
the parties’ request for “conditional certification” of the 
proposed class. 
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 The District Court premised its analysis of 
“Conditional Certification of the Settlement Class and 
Subclasses” with the following standard of review: 
“A court must determine whether the proposed 
Settlement Class and Subclasses satisfy the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 
296 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  At the preliminary 
approval stage, a court may conditionally certify 
the class for purposes of providing notice, 
leaving the final certification decision for the 
subsequent fairness hearing.  See Manual for 
Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.632 (2004).”   
Id. at 199–200. 
 For the purposes of effecting the proposed Rule 23(e) 
settlement process, the District Court appointed co-lead class 
counsel, class counsel, and subclass counsel, approved the 
dissemination of class notice, and scheduled a fairness 
hearing for November 19, 2014.  Id. at 204–07.  The District 
Court also stayed any matters as they related to the NFL 
Defendants and enjoined proposed class members from 
pursuing any related lawsuits.  Id. at 203–204, 207.  On July 
21, 2014, Objectors filed this petition for leave to appeal from 
the District Court’s July 7, 2014 order.    
II.   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1332 and is administering the coordinated or 
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consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.  A 
“party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that 
at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the 
federal court.”  Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 
F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004).  Whether we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) to review “an order granting or denying 
class-action certification” is the issue before us.  A “‘federal 
court always has jurisdiction to determine its own 
jurisdiction.’”  White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 
453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 
U.S. 622, 628 (2002)).  “We generally exercise plenary 
review over jurisdictional questions.”  Mala v. Crown Bay 
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2013).  “If we 
determine that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, 
our only function remaining will be that of announcing the 
fact and dismissing the case.”  In re Fosamax (Alendronate 
Sodium) Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (alternations, citations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
III.   
 Objectors raise various substantive challenges to the 
merits of the District Court’s July 7, 2014 order.  Before we 
can consider the merits of any appeal, it is first necessary to 
determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction.  A federal 
appellate court generally has jurisdiction over appeals only 
from the entry of a final judgment by a district court, subject 
to certain limited exceptions.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 
Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 200 (1999).  
Such is the limited nature of federal jurisdiction that “we have 
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an independent duty to satisfy ourselves of our appellate 
jurisdiction regardless of the parties’ positions.”  In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 
751 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Papotto v. 
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 
2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As aptly explained 
by Chief Justice Warren:  
“It is axiomatic, as a matter of history as well as 
doctrine, that the existence of appellate 
jurisdiction in a specific federal court over a 
given type of case is dependent upon authority 
expressly conferred by statute. And since the 
jurisdictional statutes prevailing at any given 
time are so much a product of the whole history 
of both growth and limitation of federal-court 
jurisdiction since the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 
73, they have always been interpreted in the light 
of that history and of the axiom that clear 
statutory mandate must exist to found 
jurisdiction.”   
Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957).   
 There are various exceptions to the general principle 
that appellate jurisdiction is limited to final orders.  See, e.g., 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (granting appellate jurisdiction over 
certain types of interlocutory orders); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
(allowing a district judge to certify an order involving a 
“controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion” and where “immediate 
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
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termination of the litigation”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
(permitting a district court to certify “a final judgment as to 
one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” for 
appellate review); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (permitting immediate appeal of an 
otherwise non-final collateral order under certain 
circumstances).   
 The very narrowness of appellate jurisdiction is 
designed to discourage piecemeal litigation.  Camesi v. Univ. 
of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Limited appellate jurisdiction prevents parties from 
employing tactics to “obtain review of discovery orders, 
evidentiary rulings, or any of the myriad decisions a district 
court makes before it reaches the merits of an action.”  Id. at 
245–46.  
A.   
 Rule 23(f) provides in relevant part: “A court of 
appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition 
for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 
14 days after the order is entered.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  
Before the enactment of Rule 23(f), it was well settled that a 
“class certification decision, per se, is not an appealable final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. 
Co., 566 F.2d 444, 445 (3d Cir. 1977).  Appellate courts were 
generally reluctant to grant interlocutory review of class 
certification orders.  Courts that did grant such review used 
various devices, such as a writ of mandamus under the All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), see In re Rhone-Poulenc 
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Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), or exercised 
jurisdiction after a district court certified the non-final, 
interlocutory order for appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), see Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734 (5th Cir. 1996).   
 Yet courts were confronted by the reality that an 
extraordinary writ is just that, extraordinary.  See In re Sch. 
Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992), as amended 
(Oct. 8, 1992) (“As the adjective ‘extraordinary’ implies 
however, courts of appeals must be chary in exercising that 
power: ‘[M]andamus must not be used as a mere substitute 
for appeal.’ (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 
U.S. 21, 26 (1943))).  Accordingly, even courts granting writs 
of mandamus did so “with an uneasiness that their actions 
stretched the writ’s traditionally restrictive parameters.”  
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended (Oct. 16, 2001).  
And as to § 1292(b) interlocutory appeals, these were rare 
because a district court must first certify an order for 
appellate review under limited parameters.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  Specifically, a district court would need to 
conclude that the “order involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion” and “that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”  
Id.   
 It was not until the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. to exercise mandamus that the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began to seriously 
explore reforms to appellate review and federal jurisdiction 
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over class-action certification decisions.  See Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
729, 739 (2013).  In promulgating Rule 23(f), the Advisory 
Committee exercised its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) 
and sought to “[e]xpan[d] . . . opportunities to appeal.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s notes (1998 
amendments).6  The decision whether to allow appeal from an 
                                              
6 When considering the meaning of the federal rules, “it is the 
Rule itself, not the Advisory Committee’s description of it 
that governs.”  Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541, 2559 (2011).  However, the Advisory Committee’s 
notes on the federal rules are “of weight” in interpreting the 
meaning of the rules.  Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 
U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (explaining that the Advisory 
Committee’s notes on Rule 3 “although not determinative,” 
were “of weight” in the Court’s “construction of the rule”); 
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 
(1946) (“The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as 
formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee 
does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or 
consistency.  But in ascertaining their meaning the 
construction given to them by the Committee is of weight.”). 
 In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2001), Judge Scirica 
grounded his analysis of when we may grant a Rule 23(f) 
appeal on the Advisory Committee’s notes.  Judge Scirica 
stated: “The Committee Note is always a good starting point.”  
Id.  Similarly, Justice Scalia cited extensively to the Advisory 
Committee’s notes in Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2558–59, when discussing whether a Rule 23(b)(2) 
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order granting or denying certification, however, was left to 
the “sole discretion of the court of appeals.”  Id.  
 Subdivision (f) was added to Rule 23 in 1998 to 
provide a form of interlocutory review over class-action 
certification decisions.  The reason for adding subdivision (f) 
was that the class-action “certification decision is often 
decisive as a practical matter.”  Id.  The Judicial Conference’s 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Standing 
Committee”) explained:  
“Denial of certification can toll the death knell in 
actions that seek to vindicate large numbers of 
individual claims.  Alternatively, certification can 
exert enormous pressure to settle.  Because of the 
difficulties and uncertainties that attend some 
certification decisions—those that do not fall 
within the boundaries of well-established 
practice—the need for immediate appellate 
review may be greater than the need for appellate 
review of many routine civil judgments.”   
1997 Report at 18–19.7  The Advisory Committee’s notes to 
the 1998 Amendments to Rule 23(f) provide: 
                                                                                                     
class permitted individualized claims for damages.  We 
consider the Advisory Committee’s summary of the 
provisions of Rule 23(f) illuminating for purposes of our 
analysis, giving it such “weight” as is appropriate. 
7 See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United 
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“Appeal from an order granting or denying class 
certification is permitted in the sole discretion of 
the court of appeals.  No other type of Rule 23 
order is covered by this provision.  The court of 
appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to 
permit the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised 
by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for 
certiorari.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s notes (1998 
amendments) (emphasis added).8 
                                                                                                     
States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States 18 (September 1997) (hereinafter “1997 Report”),  
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Re
ports/ST9-1997.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).  
 The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2071–
2077, authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of 
procedure.  The Supreme Court has delegated the oversight of 
the rulemaking process to the Judicial Conference, 
specifically the Standing Committee.  The Standing 
Committee has five advisory rules committees, including the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  See How the 
Rulemaking Process Works, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-
rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-works.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2014).  
8 As a comparison to the writ of certiorari, 28 U.S.C. § 1254, 
the Supreme Court separates the question of what the court 
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 In light of this drafting history, parsing the text of Rule 
23(f) is fundamental to understanding the nature of the 
interlocutory review contemplated by this provision.  To 
begin, Rule 23(f) is premised on the notion that a court of 
appeals’ grant of a petition for interlocutory review is 
discretionary.  The rule states that a “court of appeals may 
permit an appeal.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (emphasis added).  
References in the Advisory Committee’s notes that appeals 
are in the “sole discretion of the court of appeals” and that the 
court of appeals is given “unfettered discretion whether to 
permit the appeal” support this reading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) 
advisory committee’s notes (1998 amendments).   
 In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., we recognized the discretionary nature of our review: 
Rule 23(f) “provide[s] for interlocutory appeal by permission 
of the court of appeals” and “permits the appellate courts to 
develop a coherent body of jurisprudence in this area.”  259 
F.3d at 162.  There are five flexible principles from the 
Advisory Committee’s note that may guide our exercise of 
discretionary jurisdiction.9  Id. at 164–65.  The Advisory 
                                                                                                     
“may review” from what the Court “actually will choose to 
review,” which is a power that is “sparingly exercis[ed].”  See 
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 (2011) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 514 
(1897)) (exempting “one special category of cases from [the 
Court’s] usual rule against considering prevailing parties’ 
petitions”). 
9 Those principles are: “(1) when denial of certification 
effectively terminates the litigation because the value of each 
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Committee’s taxonomy is not exclusive, however, and is not 
intended to “circumscribe our discretion; there may also be 
other valid reasons for the exercise of interlocutory review.”  
Id. at 165.  Accordingly, Newton makes clear that the 
beginning text of Rule 23(f), which provides that “[a] court of 
appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal,” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(f) (emphasis added), was itself a delegation of authority 
to the courts of appeals to determine when to grant a Rule 
23(f) motion and to develop a jurisprudence to guide such 
determinations.   
 What Newton and its progeny do not discuss, and what 
this Court has yet to address, is the type of order this Court 
may review.  The plain text of Rule 23(f) provides the courts 
of appeals with discretion to permit an appeal from a specific 
type of order—that is, “from an order of a district court 
granting or denying class-action certification.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(f) (emphasis added).  The Advisory Committee’s notes 
to the 1998 Amendments to Rule 23(f) explain: “No other 
                                                                                                     
plaintiff’s claim is outweighed by the costs of stand-alone 
litigation; (2) when class certification places inordinate or 
hydraulic pressure on defendants to settle, avoiding the risk, 
however small, of potentially ruinous liability; . . . (3) when 
an appeal implicates novel or unsettled questions of law; in 
this situation, early resolution through interlocutory appeal 
may facilitate the orderly development of the law,” id. at 164; 
(4) when the district court’s “ruling on class certification is 
likely erroneous,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); or (5) when review would “facilitate development 
of the law on class certification,” id. at 165. 
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type of Rule 23 order is covered by this provision.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s notes (1998 amendments).  
There is only one subdivision within Rule 23 governing class-
action certification orders: Rule 23(c).10  In this way, the text 
of Rule 23(f) inextricably ties the type of order appealable to 
Rule 23(c).11   
                                              
10 Rule 23(c)(1) governs a class-action certification order and 
has three relevant clauses:  
“(A) Time to Issue.  At an early practicable time after a 
person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court 
must determine by order whether to certify the action as a 
class action. 
(B) Defining the Class. Appointing Class Counsel.  An 
order that certifies a class action must define the class and 
the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint 
class counsel under Rule 23(g). 
(C) Altering or Amending the Order.  An order that grants 
or denies class certification may be altered or amended 
before final judgment.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c).  
11 As explained in detail below, it is entirely possible for a 
district court to be presented with an uncertified settlement-
only class that would present both class-action certification 
issues under Rule 23(a), (b), and (c) and settlement approval 
issues under Rule 23(e).  Rule 23(e), which governs class-
action settlements, voluntary dismissals, or compromises, see 
infra note 15, “was designed to function as an additional 
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 When Rule 23(f) was enacted in 1998, Rule 23(c) 
permitted a district court to “conditionally certify” a proposed 
class.  In 2003, concerned that district courts were 
conditionally certifying putative class actions without 
undertaking a thorough analysis of the Rule 23(a) and (b) 
certification requirements, the Supreme Court and Congress 
deleted the portion of Rule 23(c)(1) that provided that class 
certification “may be conditional.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) 
advisory committee’s notes (2003 amendments).12  The 
Advisory Committee’s notes directed that “[a] court that is 
not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met 
should refuse certification until they have been met.”  Id.  
Rule 23(c)(1) was also altered to “require that the 
determination whether to certify a class” be made “at an early 
practicable time,” rather than “as soon as practicable.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This change was made 
because district courts may need time “to gather information 
necessary to make the certification decision.”  Id.  The other 
notable change within Rule 23(c)(1) was with relation to the 
                                                                                                     
requirement, not a superseding direction, for the ‘class action’ 
to which Rule 23(e) refers.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 
(emphasis added).     
12 The process to amend or enact a new federal rule of civil 
procedure is extensive and subject to multiple levels of 
review by:  the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, public commenters, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the Supreme Court, and Congress.  Amchem, 
521 U.S. at 620 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2074).   
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“provision that permits alteration or amendment of an order 
granting or denying class certification.”  Id.  The 2003 
Amendments changed the “cut-off point” to alter a class-
action certification order “at final judgment rather than ‘the 
decision on the merits’” in order to avoid “the possible 
ambiguity in referring to ‘the decision on the merits.’”  Id.  
This ambiguity stemmed from the reality that after 
determining liability and in analyzing a remedy, there may be 
“the need to amend the class definition or subdivide the 
class.”  Id.   
 Under the present structure of Rule 23(c), we made 
clear in Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc. that a district 
court was no longer permitted to issue a “conditional 
certification.” 574 F.3d 169, 202 (3d Cir. 2009).13  In 
Hohider, we analyzed a litigation class seeking certification 
over “pattern-or-practice claims of discrimination under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”  Id. at 173–74.  After 
                                              
13 We exercised jurisdiction in Hohider pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(e) and Rule 23(f).  574 F.3d at 175.  In that case, the 
district court issued an order granting in part and denying in 
part the plaintiff’s motion for certification.  Hohider v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 147, 245 (W.D. Pa. 2007) rev’d 
and remanded, 574 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009).  Unlike here, the 
order in Hohider actually certified a class (albeit not the 
entire proposed class).  Accordingly, that order was 
unquestionably issued pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).  Id.; 
Hohider, 574 F.3d at 174–75.  Because of that, we proceeded 
to review the class certification order for abuse of discretion.  
Hohider, 574 F.3d at 175. 
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analyzing the merits-based claims that could be subject to 
certification, the trial court “determined plaintiffs’ claims for 
compensatory and punitive damages could not be certified for 
classwide treatment under Rule 23(b)(2).”  Id. at 175.  The 
trial court, however, “withheld judgment on plaintiffs’ back-
pay claims” reasoning that there could be “a protocol for 
identifying those monetary damages.”  Id.  We rejected such 
an approach.  We held that the trial court’s “conditional 
certification of plaintiffs’ request for back pay was improper” 
because “[a] trial court must ‘make a definitive determination 
that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met before 
certifying a class.’”  Id. at 202 (quoting In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
Our ruling was based on the “2003 amendments to Rule 23 
[that] ‘eliminated the language that had appeared in 
Rule 23(c)(1) providing that a class certification ‘may be 
conditional.’”  Id. (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 319).14 
                                              
14 The Second Circuit has taken a different approach with 
regard to a district court’s use of the “conditional 
certification” terminology.  In Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
the Court held that district courts were still permitted to issue 
a conditional certification of a class for settlement purposes 
only.  443 F.3d 253, 269–70 (2d Cir. 2006).  The Denney 
Court reasoned that the real purpose of amending Rule 23(c) 
was not to eliminate “conditional certification” but, instead, 
“to ensure that courts understood their obligations when 
certifying a class.”  Id. at 270.  The Court concluded that in 
light of this intent,  
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“conditional certification survives the 2003 
amendment to Rule 23(c)(1). Before 
certification is proper for any purpose—
settlement, litigation, or otherwise—a court 
must ensure that the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and (b) have been met.  These requirements 
should not be watered down by virtue of the 
fact that the settlement is fair or equitable.  But 
if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are 
met, certification may be granted, conditionally 
or unconditionally.”   
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).  
 Our opinion in Hohider did not reference Denney.  The 
cases are factually distinguishable in that Hohider dealt with a 
litigation class involving some classes that had been certified 
and thus could be subject to interlocutory review under Rule 
23(f).  Although we were not presented in Hohider with the 
same jurisdictional question we consider here, we see no 
reason to question its logic as applied to a settlement class.  In 
our view, there is no support for conditional certification 
where the Advisory Committee wrote that the “provision that 
a class certification ‘may be conditional’ is deleted” and that 
“[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 
have been met should refuse certification until they have been 
met.”  The 2003 Amendments to Rule 23(c) indicate that a 
district court must make a definitive certification 
determination.  This determination is not necessarily final, 
given the availability for revisions to a class certification 
order up to the time the district court issues a final judgment.  
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 In short, Rule 23(f) provides the court of appeals broad 
discretion in granting interlocutory review, but only as to one 
type of Rule 23 order: a class-action certification order issued 
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1). 
B.    
 The issue of class certification pursuant to Rule 
23(c)(1) may also be relevant to the treatment of class-action 
settlements under Rule 23(e), which provides the procedures 
applicable to proposed settlements, voluntary dismissals, or 
compromises.15  The approval of a class-action settlement is 
                                                                                                     
See Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).  Yet, a district court calling its 
certification order “conditional” or “tentative” simply cannot 
be making a firm determination that the class satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).  Given this interplay, we 
cannot agree with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
2003 Amendments to Rule 23(c) and reject the premise that 
“conditional certification” is an order subject to review under 
Rule 23(f).  
15 Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in full: 
“Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or 
Compromise.  The claims, issues, or defenses of 
a certified class may be settled, voluntarily 
dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s 
approval. The following procedures apply to a 
proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise: 
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governed by Rule 23(e)(2), which specifically requires that a 
                                                                                                     
(1)  The court must direct notice in a 
reasonable manner to all class 
members who would be bound by 
the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class 
members, the court may approve it 
only after a hearing and on finding 
that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. 
(3)  The parties seeking approval must 
file a statement identifying any 
agreement made in connection with 
the proposal. 
(4)  If the class action was previously 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court may refuse to approve a 
settlement unless it affords a new 
opportunity to request exclusion to 
individual class members who had 
an earlier opportunity to request 
exclusion but did not do so. 
(5)  Any class member may object to 
the proposal if it requires court 
approval under this subdivision (e); 
the objection may be withdrawn 
only with the court’s approval.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 
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district court approve a settlement agreement only “after a 
hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  Thus, when a district 
court is presented with a class settlement agreement, the court 
must first determine that “the requirements for class 
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met, and must 
separately ‘determine that the settlement is fair to the class 
under [Rule] 23(e).’”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 319 (quoting In re 
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 257 (3d Cir. 
2009)).  The intent of these procedures is to provide 
transparency for class members and authority to the district 
court to act as a fiduciary for putative class members by 
“guarding the claims and rights of absent class members.”  
See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 What renders these seemingly straight-forward 
directives less than clear is the procedural posture presented 
when a class-action settlement is reached before the district 
court has issued a certification order under Rule 23(c).  The 
Advisory Committee’s notes to the 2003 Amendments do 
contemplate that “the decisions on certification and 
settlement” may “proceed simultaneously.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(e) advisory committee’s notes (2003 amendments).  
Further, even where class certification has already occurred, a 
district court’s review of a settlement “may provide an 
occasion to review the cogency of the initial class definition.”  
Id.  
 The exact process a district court should follow when 
presented with a “settlement class” is not prescribed by Rule 
23(e).  A settlement class “offers defendants the opportunity 
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to engage in settlement negotiations without conceding any of 
the arguments they may have against class certification.  
Often . . . the parties never intend to litigate the claims; rather, 
from the time plaintiffs file the complaint, the goal on both 
sides is to reach a nationwide settlement.”  In re Cmty. Bank 
of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2005).  Further, a 
district court’s management of a settlement class is different 
from a litigation class in that the court is acting as fiduciary 
“to protect unnamed members of the class.”  Ehrheart, 609 
F.3d at 593; Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 296.  These differences 
aside, “the ‘settlement only’ class has become a stock 
device.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 618.  
 Section 21.632 of the Federal Judicial Center’s 
Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) explains that the 
“[r]eview of a proposed class action settlement generally 
involves two hearings.”16  Manual for Complex Litigation 
                                              
16 Although the Manual for Complex Litigation “offer[s] 
helpful suggestions to judges,” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 327 (2001), it “does not have the force of law and can 
not undermine Supreme Court precedent or the decisions of 
this court.”  In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust 
Litig., 582 F.3d 432, 442 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Manual for 
Complex Litigation, Introduction (explaining that the Manual 
“should not be cited as[] authoritative legal or administrative 
policy,” the Federal Judicial Center has “no authority to 
prescribe practices for federal judges,” and “[t]he Manual’s 
recommendations and suggestions are merely that”).   
We address the recommendation of the Manual for 
Complex Litigation principally because it was the primary 
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authority relied upon by the District Court in issuing its 
July 7, 2014 order.  For that reason, the Manual is instructive 
only to the extent it informs the kind of order the District 
Court purported to issue.  But our analysis regarding the 
meaning of the Rules themselves is in no way dependent on 
the Manual for Complex Litigation.  See supra Section A.  
Moreover, and in accordance with widespread 
experience, reference by appellate courts to the Manual for 
Complex Litigation when it is explicitly relied upon by a 
district court is commonplace.  For example, the Supreme 
Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard ruled that the district court 
had abused its discretion in issuing an order imposing a ban 
on all communications concerning a class action between 
parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class 
member who was not a formal party.  452 U.S. 89, 91 (1981).  
The district court’s order was based largely on a “Sample 
Pretrial Order” contained in the Manual for Complex 
Litigation.  Id. at 93–94, 93 n.4, 94 n.5.  Analyzing the 
applicable text of Rule 23(d) governing “Orders in Conduct 
of Class Actions,” the Court held that “an order limiting 
communications between parties and potential class members 
should be based on a clear record and specific findings that 
reflect a weighing of the need for the limitation and the 
potential interference with the rights of the parties.”  Id. at 
101.  The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the district 
court’s adoption “in toto [of] the order suggested by the 
Manual for Complex Litigation—on the apparent assumption 
that no particularized weighing of the circumstances of the 
case was necessary.”  Id. at 102–03.   
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This Court has also, and repeatedly, engaged in close 
analysis of the Manual for Complex Litigation when it was 
the underpinning for a decision this Court was reviewing.  
See, e.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 
582 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir. 2009) (vacating the order of a 
district court that cited portions of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation, analyzing the portions of the order, and concluding 
that the Manual references “clearly do[] not have the force of 
law and can not undermine [binding authority]”); United 
States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 231 n.41 (3d Cir. 2007), as 
amended (July 2, 2007) (criticizing a district judge for 
expressly relying on the Manual for Complex Litigation in a 
criminal trial and noting that it applies, by its own terms, to 
civil litigation).  The Manual for Complex Litigation has also 
been cited where it provided useful guidance in interpreting 
an issue pertaining to class actions.  For example, in Marcus 
v. BMW of North America, LLC, we referenced general 
principles and ideas from the Manual for Complex Litigation 
for the proposition that the “ascertainability” standard 
applicable to a Rule 23(b)(3) class promotes the “best notice 
practicable” under Rule 23(c)(2).  687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.222 (4th 
ed. 2004)).  And in In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 246 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001), we cited the Manual for 
Complex Litigation as authority regarding the equitable 
powers of the court in settlement administration.  
In short, our analysis of the District Court’s July 7, 
2014 order, the order’s explicit reference to the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, and our explanation that the Manual does 
not adequately address how an order issued pursuant to Rule 
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§ 21.632 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter “Manual for Complex 
Litigation”).  In the first hearing, or “preliminary fairness 
review,” “counsel submit the proposed terms of settlement 
and the judge makes a preliminary fairness evaluation.”  Id.  
In the context of a “preliminary fairness review” of an 
uncertified settlement class, § 21.632 provides that “the 
certification hearing and preliminary fairness evaluation can 
usually be combined.”  Id.  When combining a certification 
and preliminary fairness hearing: 
“The judge should make a preliminary 
determination that the proposed class satisfies the 
criteria set out in Rule 23(a) and at least one of 
the subsections of Rule 23(b). See section 21.22. 
If there is a need for subclasses, the judge must 
define them and appoint counsel to represent 
them. The judge must make a preliminary 
determination on the fairness, reasonableness, 
and adequacy of the settlement terms and must 
direct the preparation of notice of the 
certification, proposed settlement, and date of the 
final fairness hearing.” 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 This case management technique for uncertified 
settlement classes makes sense, particularly from a notice 
perspective.  Rule 23(e)(1) requires the district court to 
                                                                                                     
23(e) relates to Rule 23(c) is analytically consistent with 
Bernard and entirely unremarkable.   
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“direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members 
who would be bound by the proposal.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(e)(1).  The principal purpose of this provision is “to ensure 
that absentee class members, for whom a settlement will have 
preclusive effect, have an opportunity to review the materials 
relevant to the proposed settlement and to be heard or 
otherwise take steps to protect their rights before the court 
approves or rejects the settlement.”  2 McLaughlin on Class 
Actions § 6:17 (10th ed. 2013).  This notice can be sent to 
putative class members before the district court issues a 
certification order or, “[i]n cases in which a litigation class 
has already been certified . . . the notice of settlement may 
also be sent to . . . opt-outs to give them an opportunity to 
rejoin the class.”  Id.     
 The preliminary analysis of a proposed class is 
therefore a tool for settlement used by the parties to fairly and 
efficiently resolve litigation.  In the context of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
opt-out class, this affords defendants the opportunity to 
determine whether there will be sufficient participation in the 
class before certifying the class and dispersing any settlement 
fund.  This also allows the parties to forgo a trial on the 
merits, which often leaves more money for the resolution of 
claims. 
 Arguably, the Manual for Complex Litigation does not 
reconcile a “preliminary determination” under Rule 23(e) of 
class certification with the elimination of conditional 
certification under Rule 23(c).  Although the Federal Judicial 
Center’s current version of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation was published in 2004, it is unclear whether the 
drafters had the opportunity to address the nuances between 
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subdivisions (c) and (f) of Rule 23 following the 2003 
Amendments.17  Despite that, many district court judges rely, 
and rightfully so, on the Manual for Complex Litigation in 
managing class actions.   
 In light of the interplay between subdivision (c), (e), 
and (f) of Rule 23, we emphasize that a district court should 
be fastidious in its choice of language when making a 
“preliminary determination” as recommended by § 21.632.18  
                                              
17 The dissent quotes our use of the word ‘unclear’ in this 
sentence and writes: “What all this [Section 21.632 of the 
Manual] has to do with Rule 23(f) ‘is unclear.’”  The dissent 
rests on this language in its continued attempt to characterize 
this opinion as relying on the Manual for Complex Litigation 
to interpret the meaning of Rules 23(c) and (f), and how those 
Rules relate to Rule 23(e).  To repeat, the Manual is not 
binding authority.  In fact, the Manual is particularly 
unhelpful regarding the scope of Rule 23(f) interlocutory 
review given that it was published in 2004 and the relevant 
amendments to Rule 23(c) took effect December 1, 2003. 
18 The dissent characterizes this paragraph and various other 
parts of our reasoning as dicta.   Broadly stated, dictum is 
defined “as ‘a statement in a judicial opinion that could have 
been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical 
foundations of the holding—that, being peripheral, may not 
have received the full and careful consideration of the court 
that uttered it.’”  In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 
2000) (quoting Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 
1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986)).  Being clear about how district 
courts can best navigate our holding, to avoid confusion, is 
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To be clear: “conditional certification” should not be a 
preferred term of art in this Circuit.  District courts should not 
couch a ruling as providing “conditional certification” when 
they actually intend to issue a certification order at a later 
date.  Instead, district courts should more appropriately note 
that they are conducting a “preliminary determination” 
regarding class certification for a settlement class in order to 
provide notice to absent class members and that they are 
reserving the certification decision for a later date.  
Conditional certification rulings are not contemplated under 
Rule 23(c)(1) and district courts always have the ability to 
                                                                                                     
not something we regard as peripheral discussion.  We 
consider it prudent to address the recommendation of the 
Manual for Complex Litigation in light of our holding 
regarding what type of Rule 23 order is subject to review 
under Rule 23(f).    
 Nor is the application of our holding to the facts in this 
case mere dicta.  See Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (explaining that the “well-established 
rationale” of a decision is not dicta).  The central basis for our 
holding is that the review permitted by Rule 23(f) is bound to 
and limited by the decision of whether to grant or deny class 
certification, as permitted by Rule 23(c).  Applying this 
principle to the District Court’s order is a necessary predicate 
to reaching our conclusion.  See Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands 
Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that 
reasoning in excess of what is necessary to reach a conclusion 
is dicta). 
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amend and alter an order before final judgment under 
Rule 23(c)(1)(C).  See Hohider, 574 F.3d at 202; In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 320.  Courts 
wishing to actually make a class-action certification decision 
at a preliminary fairness hearing should do so by issuing an 
order pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) and without reference to the 
order being “conditional.” 
C.    
 We hold that an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 
23(f) permits the court of appeals to review only an “order 
granting or denying class-action certification” issued pursuant 
to Rule 23(c)(1).  An order issued under some other 
subdivision of Rule 23, such as a case management order 
issued pursuant to Rule 23(e) that “preliminarily” or 
“conditionally” addresses class certification but reserves the 
class certification determination for a later time, does not 
qualify as an “order granting or denying class-action 
certification” that is subject to interlocutory review under 
Rule 23(f).19  Such is the case before us.  We conclude that 
the District Court’s July 7, 2014 order that “conditionally 
certified” the proposed settlement class and subclasses was 
not issued pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).  Instead, the District 
Court properly exercised its authority under Rule 23(e) and 
                                              
19 As always, the substance of a ruling is what matters, not its 
label.  An order that is for practical purposes a Rule 23(c)(1) 
class certification will not avoid appellate review simply 
because it is called something else.   
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was managing a class-action settlement agreement as 
requested by the parties.   
 The structure and text of the District Court’s order and 
memorandum support this conclusion.  Two aspects of the 
District Court’s order are telling.  First, the District Court 
ordered that the “proposed Class Action Settlement 
Agreement is preliminarily approved” and that the 
“Settlement Class and Subclasses are conditionally certified 
for settlement purposes only.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. at 204 
(emphasis added).  The order specifically couched review of 
the settlement agreement as “preliminary” and the class was 
only “conditionally certified for settlement purposes.”   
 Second, the District Court scheduled a fairness hearing 
for November 19, 2014 to “consider comments on and 
objections to the proposed Settlement Agreement and to 
consider whether: (a) to approve the Settlement Agreement as 
fair, reasonable, and adequate, pursuant to Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (b) to certify the Settlement 
Class and Subclasses, and (c) to enter the Final Order and 
Judgment as provided in Article XX of the Settlement 
Agreement.”  Id. at 206–07 (emphasis added).  This language 
clearly reveals that the District Court regarded its July 7, 2014 
order as having not yet reached a Rule 23(c)(1) determination 
on class certification. 
 The notice template attached to the District Court’s 
order also made patent that the settlement itself was only 
“proposed” and identified the “proposed class 
representatives” and their lawyers.  Id. at 208, Ex. 1.  Had the 
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District Court actually certified the class, the class 
representatives would not have been described as “proposed,” 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); rather, class counsel would have 
been appointed outright, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), 
23(g).  
 Yet ultimately it is the content of the District Court’s 
memorandum that is most telling.  The District Court began 
its discussion of “Conditional Certification of the Settlement 
Class and Subclasses” with the following standard of review: 
“A court must determine whether the proposed 
Settlement Class and Subclasses satisfy the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.  See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 
296 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  At the preliminary 
approval stage, a court may conditionally certify 
the class for purposes of providing notice, 
leaving the final certification decision for the 
subsequent fairness hearing.  See Manual for 
Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 21.632 (2004).” 
In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury 
Litig., 301 F.R.D. at 199–200.   
 The District Court premised its Rule 23(a) and (b) 
analysis on the analytical approach suggested by § 21.632 of 
the Manual for Complex Litigation.20  The District Court also 
                                              
20 The District Court cited to our en banc decision in Sullivan 
for the proposition that “before approving a settlement 
agreement, ‘a district court first must determine that the 
41 
 
made clear that its preliminary approval was “for purposes of 
providing notice.”  Id.  The District Court expressly provided 
in its memorandum that the proposed settlement class and 
subclasses “preliminarily satisf[ied]” the requirements of 
Rule 23(a) and (b).  Id. at 202.  The thoroughness and 
precision of the District Judge’s memorandum indicates that 
had she actually wished to certify the proposed class and 
subclasses, she would have done so and referenced Rule 
23(c)(1).  We read the District Court’s order and 
memorandum as having expertly addressed the management 
of a settlement class and no more. 
                                                                                                     
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) 
are met.’” 667 F.3d at 296 (quoting In re Pet Foods Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Sullivan does 
not address what a district court must do in conducting a 
“preliminary fairness hearing” where the district court 
reserves its certification ruling for a later date.  Further, the 
rule from Sullivan is based on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Amchem, a case that did not address the procedural posture 
we face here.  Amchem held only that for a settlement-only 
class “a district court need not inquire whether the case, if 
tried, would present intractable management problems,” but 
that the “other specifications of [Rule 23(b)(3)] . . . demand 
undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement 
context.”  521 U.S. at 620 (citation omitted).  Further, 
Amchem was written at a time when conditional certification 
was expressly authorized by Rule 23(c); it could not, 
therefore, have addressed the procedural posture presented in 
this case.  
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 Accordingly, the District Court’s July 7, 2014 order 
reserved the determination of certification and fairness until 
after the November 19, 2014 hearing.  The District Court’s 
accompanying July 7, 2014 memorandum conducted only a 
basic and necessarily contingent analysis—in short, a 
“preliminary” analysis—of Rule 23(a) and (b) to determine 
whether the proposed approach to settlement and for 
providing notice to the putative class members were effective 
case management tools.  
 The District Court did not certify the class.  Instead, it 
reserved the “rigorous analysis” prescribed by Hydrogen 
Peroxide until after the November 19, 2014 fairness hearing, 
at which a full record could be developed.  We clarify for the 
first time for district courts in this Circuit that the Manual for 
Complex Litigation’s use of the phrase “conditional 
certification” should be avoided.  Rather than use the word 
“conditional,” courts in a similar procedural posture should 
make clear that they are making a “preliminary 
determination” on class-action certification for the purpose of 
issuing notice of settlement, and that they are reserving the 
issuance of a certification order until after a fairness hearing.  
The certification order ultimately issued must necessarily be 
entered before the district court approves the class settlement, 
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 296, but need not occur before providing 
notice under Rule 23(e)(1).  Permitting a district court to 
manage a settlement class in this manner provides the 
flexibility needed to protect absent class members’ interests 
and efficiently evaluate the issues of class certification and 
approval of a settlement agreement.  
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 Objectors disagree with this interpretation of the 
District Court’s order and contend that five basic points 
govern the analysis of our jurisdiction under Rule 23(f).  
None of these points are persuasive. 
 First, Objectors argue that the District Court need not 
issue a “final” class-action certification order for the court of 
appeals to have jurisdiction.  This focus on a “final” order, 
however, misses the point.  Rule 23(c)(1)(C) provides that an 
“order that grants or denies class certification may be altered 
or amended before final judgment.”  Thus, all certification 
orders issued under Rule 23(c)(1) are as a practical matter 
“conditional” so far as they are subject to change before the 
district court enters final judgment.  This means that a district 
court cannot grant “certification on the condition” that a Rule 
23(a) or (b) certification requirement is later met.  Hohider, 
574 F.3d at 202.  The District Court premised its analysis on 
providing notice to absent class members before issuing an 
order on certification or approving the settlement agreement.  
Rather than limit Rule 23(f) appeals to “final” orders, our 
holding today is simply that a district court must issue an 
order pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) before we have jurisdiction to 
conduct interlocutory review pursuant to Rule 23(f).  
 Objectors’ second point is that Rule 23(f) is intended 
to afford an opportunity for prompt correction of a district 
court’s error to spare the parties significant litigation or 
settlement costs.  Here the District Court has yet to commit 
any error that we could correct.  In fact, the very purpose of 
the July 7, 2014 order was to provide putative class members 
with notice so that they could meaningfully participate in the 
fairness hearing.  Reviewing the July 7, 2010 order now 
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would “greatly undermine the policy against piecemeal 
litigation.”  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 246.     
 Regarding the issues of litigation and settlement costs, 
Objectors erroneously focus on the typical pressures facing a 
litigation class rather than a settlement class.  In a traditional 
litigation class, after a class-action certification order, the 
result could “sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the 
part of the plaintiffs” or place “hydraulic pressure on 
defendants to settle.”  Newton, 259 F.3d at 162, 164 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the District 
Court reserved issuing its class certification order until after 
the fairness hearing, we are left with dead silence rather than 
a death knell.  Moreover, there can be no application of 
hydraulic pressure where there has been no application of 
force at all.  Here, NFL Defendants elected to negotiate a 
settlement agreement.  The District Court’s “preliminary 
determination” regarding class certification did not so 
pressure NFL Defendants that they were forced to settle the 
pending lawsuits.  
 Third, Objectors cite to the “unfettered discretion” 
granted to courts of appeals in permitting a Rule 23(f) 
interlocutory appeal.  As noted above, this cherry-picked 
phrase from the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1998 
Amendments fails to distinguish between the different textual 
components of Rule 23(f).  Although the word “may” gives 
the courts of appeals unfettered discretion, that discretion is 
only applicable to appeals “from an order granting or denying 
class-action certification.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).   
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 We grant that there is some ambiguity in the 1998 
Amendments regarding the type of order that may be subject 
to interlocutory review under Rule 23(f).  The Advisory 
Committee’s notes to the 1998 Amendments to Rule 23(f) 
provide: 
“The district court, having worked through the 
certification decision, often will be able to 
provide cogent advice on the factors that bear on 
the decision whether to permit appeal.  This 
advice can be particularly valuable if the 
certification decision is tentative.  Even to a firm 
certification decision, a statement of reasons 
bearing on the probably [sic] benefits and costs 
of immediate appeal can help focus the court of 
appeals decision, and may persuade the 
disappointed party that an attempt to appeal 
would be fruitless.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s notes (1998 
amendments) (emphasis added).  References to a “tentative” 
versus a “firm certification decision” may indicate to some 
that “preliminary” or “conditional” certification decisions are 
properly subject to interlocutory review.  
 Although the Advisory Committee did not revise or 
cross reference these comments in the 2003 Amendments to 
Rule 23(c), the text of Rule 23(f) did not require such a 
revision.  Rule 23(f) is tied by reference to “an order granting 
or denying class-action certification.”  Therefore, an order is 
only reviewable under 23(f) once a district judge has actually 
issued an order granting or denying class certification under 
46 
 
Rule 23(c)(1).  As in the game itself, we do not have instant 
replay over all aspects of the parties’ progression prior to that 
point.  Cf. Official Playing Rules of the National Football 
League, R. 15, § 9, Art. 5 (2013 ed.) (no jurisdiction to 
review an official’s determination as to what down it is). 
 Accordingly, any “unfettered discretion” held by the 
courts of appeals would be applicable to only “an order 
granting or denying class certification . . . .  No other type of 
Rule 23 order is covered by this provision.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f) advisory committee’s notes (1998 amendments) 
(emphasis added).  Any question of what the Advisory 
Committee might have meant when referencing “tentative” is 
meaningless considering that “tentative” or “conditional” 
class-action certification orders are no longer permitted under 
Rule 23(c).  
 Objectors fourth point is that we should evaluate a 
district court’s “ruling on class certification” that is “likely 
erroneous.”  See Newton, 259 F.3d at 164.  This position 
presumes that there is a ruling available to analyze, which 
there is not.  That ruling is destined to be issued now that the 
District Court has conducted the November 19, 2014 fairness 
hearing.  The use of the phrase “likely” in Newton cannot be 
read to imply that we should anticipate how a district court 
might err based on a Rule 23(e) preliminary determination of 
class certification.  If such a reading of Newton were given 
warrant, courts of appeals could meddle at will in the district 
courts’ careful and thoughtful management in reviewing class 
settlement agreements. 
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 Objectors’ final point also relies on Newton and our 
statement that our discretion to grant interlocutory review 
may be based on any consideration we deem persuasive.  See 
id. at 165.  This argument continues to misconstrue Newton as 
an answer to the open question before us: precisely what 
qualifies as an “order granting or denying class-action 
certification”?  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  Although we “may 
permit an appeal” only from such an order, the discretion 
inherent in the word “may” cannot undermine the fact that 
Rule 23(f) pertains only to one type of order under Rule 23.  
 As a final matter, both parties cite to the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Liles v. Del Campo, 350 F.3d 742 (8th 
Cir. 2003), as supporting their respective positions.  Objectors 
argue that Liles stands for the proposition that an 
interlocutory appeal of an order granting preliminary 
proposed or “conditional” certification may be permitted 
under Rule 23(f).  This contention stretches the logic of Liles.  
Liles did not address the scope of the court of appeals’ 
jurisdiction under Rule 23(f).  The Eighth Circuit held the 
following: 
“We conclude that an interlocutory appeal would 
be premature in this case. Several steps remain 
before the district court finally approves class 
certification and any settlement.  To permit an 
appeal at this stage would unnecessarily delay the 
resolution of the litigation and further jeopardize 
the limited assets available for resolving the 
claims.  Permission for an interlocutory appeal of 
the conditional class certification should 
therefore be denied.” 
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Id. at 746 (emphasis added).   
 Objectors quote the Liles Court’s statement that an 
interlocutory appeal “would be premature in this case,” id., 
and argue that there may be some case presenting a 
conditional certification question that would properly be 
addressed under Rule 23(f).  A reading of the full paragraph, 
however, reveals that the Eighth Circuit was hesitant to 
review a district court’s order that does not “approve[] class 
certification and any settlement.”  Id.  As in this case, the 
Liles litigation involved a “joint motion for preliminary 
approval of a settlement agreement and for conditional class 
certification” that resulted from settlement negotiations.  Id. 
at 744.  The more sound reading of Liles is that there is 
simply nothing for a court of appeals to review under Rule 
23(f) before the district court issues a certification order under 
Rule 23(c).  Objectors’ interpretation of Liles is unpersuasive 
and the facts of this case present precisely the same problem, 
i.e., that there is nothing to review until the district court 
issues its certification order following the fairness hearing.   
 In sum, the District Court’s order and memorandum 
pursuant to Rule 23(e) that provided preliminary approval of 
the proposed class “for settlement purposes only” and 
explicitly reserved its certification order for a later date was 
not a class-action certification order under Rule 23(c).  
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Objectors’ 
petition. 
IV.   
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 Because the District Court has yet to issue “an order 
granting or denying class-action certification,” we have 
dismissed the Rule 23(f) petition for lack of jurisdiction by 
our Order of September 11, 2014. 
In re: NFL Players Concussion Injury Litigation 
No.  14-8103 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 Petitioners seek, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f), our review of Judge Brody’s “conditional certification” 
of a settlement class and subclasses as “preliminarily 
satisfy[ing] the requirements of Rule 23.”  In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 
F.R.D. 191, 202 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  My colleagues dismiss the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction because they deem 
“conditional” class-certification orders as no longer proper 
under Rule 23(c), the only provision in Rule 23 directly 
concerning class certifications.  As I believe Rule 23(f) 
authorized (and for sure nowhere limits—in word or intent) 
our review of the order Judge Brody entered, I would deny 
the petition for review because granting it would result in 
inefficient (indeed, chaotic) piecemeal litigation that would 
interfere with the formal fairness hearing on the settlement.  
Though in either case petitioners lose, I dissent from my 
colleagues’ means to that end.   
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), adopted in 
1998, states that “[a] court of appeals may permit an appeal 
from an order granting or denying class-action certification 
under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed 
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is 
entered.”  Per the Advisory Committee Note for this 
provision, permission is “in the sole discretion of the court of 
appeals,” which  
is given unfettered discretion whether to permit 
the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by 
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the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for 
certiorari.   
*    *    * 
 The district court, having worked 
through the certification decision, often will be 
able to provide cogent advice on the factors that 
bear on the decision whether to permit appeal.  
This advice can be particularly valuable if the 
certification decision is tentative.   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) Advisory Committee’s Notes (1998 
amendments) (emphases added). 
 Five years later, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(c)(1) was modified to eliminate class certifications that 
“may be conditional” on later proof that a proper class exists.  
Thus a “court that is not satisfied that the requirements of 
Rule 23 [in effect, sections (a) and (b)] have been met should 
refuse certification until they have been met.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(c) Advisory Committee’s Notes (2003 amendments).  No 
change to section (f) occurred, nor was there any Advisory 
Committee comment as to the effect of the (c)(1) change on 
section (f).  The blink response, both textual and logical, is 
that appellate courts still have “unfettered discretion” to 
review class-certification orders of any kind—whether 
conditional (especially so where a court is not satisfied that 
there exists what Rule 23 requires to certify a class) or not. 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have as thorough 
a review process as any I know (or can imagine).  In practice, 
that process begins with the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, which is comprised of civil procedure experts from the 
judiciary and academia and is advised by one or more 
reporters assigned to it.  The Advisory Committee reviews 
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suggestions for Rules changes and drafts proposed new Rules 
and Rules amendments along with annotated notes of 
explanation.  When the Advisory Committee decides to 
recommend an amendment, it seeks approval from the 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (the “Standing Committee”) to publish a proposed 
amendment for comment from the bench, bar and public.  The 
comment period lasts at least six months and includes public 
hearings.  The Advisory Committee reviews the comments 
and hearing testimony, typically makes changes to the 
proposed Rules (if substantial, an additional period for notice 
and comment usually follows), and forwards those changes to 
the Standing Committee along with any minority views of 
Advisory Committee members.  If the Standing Committee 
approves the proposals of the Advisory Committee, it 
forwards them to the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(which includes at its head the Chief Justice of the United 
States) along with the Advisory Committee’s report and the 
Standing Committee’s own recommendations.  If approved 
by the Judicial Conference, and Congress does not act 
otherwise, the Rules go into effect.  See How the Rule Making 
Process Works, Overview for the Bench, Bar and Public, 
United States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-
works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 
2014).  What all this means is that experts on civil procedure 
review all content of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It 
is the opposite of “legislative history” drafted two weeks after 
a floor amendment passes in Congress.   
 In reviewing any Civil Rules dispute, a court’s intent is 
to follow the drafters’ intent.  The latter is taken from a 
Rule’s words and the accompanying Advisory Committee 
Notes.  As we know from reading the Rules and their Notes, 
little is left to the imagination.  In this case, the text of Rule 
23(f) grants without restriction the authority to consider 
4 
 
appeals from orders granting or denying class certification, 
and its Advisory Committee Note makes clear the grant is so 
unconstrained that it is the equal of the discretion given the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari.  If, for example, an order 
certified a class without findings that Rule 23 requirements 
are met (hence a conditional order), a court of appeals can 
rule that this is improper and deny the appeal.  This is what 
our Court did in Hohider v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 574 
F.3d 169, 202 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Despite this, my colleagues think the change in 2003 
to subsection (c)(1) annuls the jurisdiction of an appellate 
court even to consider an appeal from a conditional class-
certification order.  Their logic at base is that a change in 
2003 to circumscribe Rule 23(c)(1) must intend a change to 
23(f) such that no longer can there be appeals literally “from 
an order granting . . . class action certification,” but only from 
an order “issued pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).  An order . . . that 
‘preliminarily’ or ‘conditionally’ addresses class certification 
but reserves the class certification determination for a later 
time, does not qualify as an ‘order granting or denying class-
action certification’ that is subject to interlocutory review 
under Rule 23(f).”  Maj. Op. at 37-38.  In layperson-speak, 
the drafters somehow forgot to limit “order” in section (f) or 
to change the Advisory Committee Note to that section.  I 
cannot go for this overstretch when the words of Rule 23(f) 
are nowhere short of clear and the consequence is that a 
federal appellate court gives back jurisdiction given it by our 
Rules drafters and those who must approve that grant. 
 A textualist (one who seeks the meaning of a statute or 
regulation by reviewing its actual words without resort to 
extratextual sources) begins with the text of Rule 23(f), and 
so does Judge Smith, a well-regarded textualist.  Indeed, he 
claims here to rely on “plain text.”  Id. at 6, 22.  That’s ironic, 
as the Rule’s direct text gives appellate courts the discretion 
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to allow interlocutory appeals from class-certification orders.  
But, says Judge Smith, the “type of order” has yet to be 
addressed.  Id. at 22 (emphasis in text).  Only one 
“subdivision within Rule 23 govern[s] class-action 
certification orders: Rule 23(c).”  Id.  Though in 1998 it 
allowed district courts to certify a class conditionally, that 
authority, he believes, was taken away in 2003 when “a 
district court was no longer permitted to issue a ‘conditional 
certification.’”  Id. at 25 (citing Hohider, 574 F.3d at 202). 
 What is interesting in citing our 2009 decision in 
Hohider is that there our Court noted that it had “jurisdiction 
over this interlocutory appeal [involving, among other things, 
an improper conditional certification of a class] under . . . 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).”  574 F.3d at 175, 202.  Despite the 
2003 amendment to Rule 23(c), in 2009 we had the appellate 
authority to tell a district court that it may not certify a class 
conditionally.  My colleagues acknowledge this by their 
statement that Hohider “held that the trial court’s ‘conditional 
certification . . . was improper.’”  Maj. Op. at 25-26 
(emphases added) (quoting Hohider, 574 F.3d at 202). 
 The exercise of jurisdiction over a conditional 
certification is what our Second Circuit colleagues did as well 
in Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 269-70 (2d 
Cir. 2006), though there the Court went further to hold that 
“conditional certification survives the 2003 amendment to 
Rule 23(c)(1),” id. at 270.  The Eighth Circuit also did not 
question its jurisdiction to review a conditional certification 
order in Liles v. Del Campo, 350 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2003).  (I 
note that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Liles issued only the 
day after the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c) went into effect, 
and the Court did not address directly its jurisdiction.  That 
said, the proposed changes to (c) were in circulation many 
months before they were effective.) 
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 So how, five years after Hohider, can our Court 
pronounce that we have no jurisdiction?  Here is my 
colleagues’ take.  Judge Brody’s order that, in her words, 
“conditionally certified” the proposed settlement class and 
subclasses was not issued pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1).  Instead, 
“[she] exercised [her] authority under Rule 23(e) [which 
covers settlement procedures for class action settlements] and 
was managing a class-action settlement agreement.”  Maj. 
Op. at 38.  However, as “[t]he exact process a district court 
should follow when presented with a ‘settlement class’ is not 
prescribed by Rule 23(e),” id. at 30, the Manual for Complex 
Litigation (4th ed. 2004) is consulted even though my 
colleagues concede it  
“does not have the force of law and can not 
undermine . . . decisions of this court.” In re 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 
582 F.3d 432, 442 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 
Manual for Complex Litigation, Introduction 
(explaining that the Manual “should not be 
cited as[] authoritative legal or administrative 
policy,” the Federal Judicial Center has “no 
authority to prescribe practices for federal 
judges,” and “[t]he Manual’s recommendations 
and suggestions are merely that”).  
Maj. Op. at 31 n.16.   
 Notwithstanding these statements to the contrary, id. at 
31-33 n.16; id. at 35 n.17, my colleagues in effect move the 
Manual above the Rule and its commentary.  They do so as 
follows.  Section 21.632 of the Manual provides that “the 
certification hearing and preliminary fairness evaluation can 
usually be combined.”  In doing so, “‘[t]he judge should 
make a preliminary determination that the proposed class 
satisfies the criteria set out in Rule 23(a) and at least one of 
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the subsections of Rule 23(b).’”  Maj. Op. at 33-34 (quoting 
Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632 (emphasis added in 
quote)).  Calling this a “case management technique,” id. at 
34,  to ensure notice to absentee class members, “[t]he 
preliminary analysis of a proposed class is therefore a tool for 
settlement.”  Id. (emphasis in text).   
 What all this has to do with Rule 23(f) “is unclear.”  
Id. at 35.  But there is an “interplay between subdivision (c), 
(e), and (f) of Rule 23, [and my colleagues] emphasize that a 
district court should be fastidious in its choice of language 
when making a ‘preliminary determination’ as recommended 
by § 21.632 [of the Manual].”  Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 What’s the point?  “To be clear: ‘conditional 
certification’ should not be a preferred term of art in this 
Circuit.  District courts should not couch  a ruling as 
providing ‘conditional certification’ when they actually 
intend to issue a certification order at a later date.”  Id. at 37. 
Our Court, though it does not have the jurisdiction to tell 
Judge Brody that her “conditional certification” is not the 
right call sign, nonetheless in several pages of dicta tells her 
so. 
 My take on my colleagues’ reasoning is, to quote the 
late Hollywood film producer Samuel Goldwyn, “Include me 
out.”  Here’s why.  Our highly experienced and respected 
District Court colleague knew exactly what she was doing.  
Judge Brody “conditionally certified” a class and subclasses 
“for settlement purposes only.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 F.R.D. at 204.  She did 
so after analyzing the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), id. 
at 199-202, and found that the proposed settlement class and 
subclasses “preliminarily satisf[ied]” those requirements, id. 
at 202.  This was not the type of premature and unanalyzed 
approval of a litigation class that Rule 23(c) meant to bar 
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because conditional certifications of litigation classes give 
inordinate leverage to plaintiffs’ class counsel to force a 
settlement not called for under closer scrutiny.  Rather, Judge 
Brody, after satisfying herself that the relevant Rule 23(a) and 
(b) requirements were met, provisionally certified a class 
already set to settle once that settlement is found to be fair at 
a later hearing.  (Indeed, she gave “preliminary approval” of 
the proposed settlement after making a “preliminary fairness 
evaluation” of it.  Id. at 197-99.)  That certification was 
needed to know to whom notice and the settlement should be 
sent.  The use of “conditional” in this context is thus not 
verboten under subsection (c)(1).  Indeed, conditional 
certifications for settlement classes continue after 2003.  See 
Denney, 443 F.3d at 269-70; see also Ault v. Walt Disney 
World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting the 
use of conditional certification by the district court).  
 Even if we assume Judge Brody used “conditional” 
incorrectly, “an error in the class certification decision that 
does not implicate novel or unsettled legal questions may still 
merit interlocutory review given the consequences likely to 
ensue . . . .  [W]e emphasize that the courts of appeals have 
been afforded the authority to grant or deny [Rule 23(f)] 
petitions ‘on the basis of any consideration that the court of 
appeals finds persuasive.’”  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, 259 F.3d 154, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) Advisory Committee’s Notes 
(1998 amendments)). 
*    *    *    *    * 
 My colleagues and I can agree that appellate courts 
should be reluctant to review class-certification orders on an 
interlocutory basis.  To me that is enough.  To go so far 
further by holding that we lack even the power to do so here 
is a bridge too far (especially in the wake of Hohider and no 
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other Circuit after 2003 finding its jurisdiction lost for 
interlocutory appeals of conditional class certifications).  
There is no support for ceding jurisdiction in the words of 
Rule 23(f), the Advisory Committee Note for that section, or 
subsection (c)(1).  To seek that support in the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, which tells us it is not to be cited as 
authority, “complexifies” what is simple: appellate courts 
have “unfettered discretion” to consider any order that grants 
or denies class-action certification.  Those certification orders 
were circumscribed in 2003 to ones that require more careful 
attention to the well-understood requirements of Rule 23(a) 
and (b).  That occurred without any change to the 
unconstrained review of certification orders given to appellate 
courts only five years earlier.  Hence Rule 23(c) does not 
bleach out the simple and direct words of Rule 23(f).   
 If Rule 23(f) appellate jurisdiction is to be limited, it 
must come from its drafters amid the well-conceived approval 
process in place.  In the meantime, not to follow the words of 
Rules in place substitutes us as their drafters and makers of 
policy.  As that is too active a role for a court, I respectfully 
dissent. 
